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ABSTRACT. This paper adopts an autobiographical tone to review the linguistic 
turn and its demise at the hands Richard Rorty. Rorty, along with Continental phi- 
losophers like Lyotard rescued us from a philosophical delusion that we might 
achieve a neutral analysis resulting in linguistic and conceptual hygiene. This view 
became the basis of a highly influential doctrine in philosophy of education during 
the 1970s under R. S. Peters and the London school. I review the Wittgenstein-
inspired movement and its conceptual affinities with postpositivism, postmodernism 
and postcoloniality as the dominating motifs of the age we have now passed beyond. 
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1. Introduction: The Ends of History 
 
I remember the intellectual excitement when I first discovered Jean-François 
Lyotard’s (1984) The Postmodern Condition. I read the book the year it was 
translated into English while finishing a PhD in philosophy of education on 
Ludwig Wittgenstein with a thesis entitled ‘The problem of rationality.’ 
Earlier after completing an MA in philosophy at the University of Auckland I 
had been warned off the late Wittgenstein as too ‘unphilosophical’. The 
early Wittgenstein was fine but the later Wittgenstein evidently was not. I 
persisted in my own philosophical tastes and preferences and eventually 
found a philosopher of education, Jim Marshall, who was willing to super- 
vise my work on Wittgenstein, which initially focused on the question of 
cultural relativism. 
Lyotard’s reading of Wittgenstein while playful, imaginative and a ‘cre- 
ative misappropriation’, as I have argued (Peters, 1999), nonetheless struck 
me as a thunderbolt from the blue. It provided a political interpretation of 
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Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language that I thought both necessary and 
warranted. I translated for myself into bad English his essay ‘Wittgenstein 
“After”’ (Lyotard, 1993) about the ‘mourning’ of the loss of language that I 
found insightful and that helped to historically locate Wittgenstein’s attempt 
to deal with the problem of nihilism that is strongly influenced and pre-
figured in Nietzsche. 
At that very moment I became ‘poststructuralist’ in my interests and 
‘postmodern’ in my sensibilities, finding ways to reinterpret Wittgenstein in 
the light of a broadly postmodernist canvas – both the content and structure 
of his thought, especially the Investigations, and also his style of philosophiz- 
ing (Peters & Marshall, 1999; Peters, Burbules, & Smeyers, 2010). This 
was I now realize a process of fictionalizing the past, a kind of creative 
historiography of philosophy that grew out of the postmodern emphasis on 
language and the crafting of historical narrative. My postmodernist reading 
of Wittgenstein was assisted enormously not only by Lyotard’s influential 
adaptation of ‘language-games’ as a method in The Postmodern Condition 
but also by the early account of Alan Janik and Stephen Toulmin (1972) of 
Wittgenstein in terms of Viennese modernism. These texts were not based on 
close or accurate readings of Wittgenstein but they were inspired speculations 
that led to new horizons and applications.   
I was enabled through this new awareness of textuality – new forms of 
reading and writing the text, hypertextuality, metatextuality – that gelled 
with both philosophical hermeneutics and also with at least one significant 
direction that post-analytical philosophy took with Richard Rorty after the 
‘death’ of Kantian-styled analysis. Rorty’s linguistic turn had finally col- 
lapsed into a kind of philosophical hermeneutics he called ‘conversation’ 
that was in reality a combination of Michael Oakeshott’s emphasis on liberal 
learning and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. In phi- 
losophy it represented a move away from epistemology-centered philosophy 
and forms of foundationalism and representationalism. Its popularization in 
philosophy led to the slow decline of analysis as a form of conceptual anal- 
ysis or conceptual clarification. The latter view of philosophy as clarification 
does hold a place in Wittgenstein’s thought but nothing like the obsession 
with a magical method and ‘linguistic hygiene’ that characterized the depiction 
of Wittgenstein proposed by R. S. Peters of the London School, which had 
taken the linguistic turn. As philosophers of education R. S. Peters and the 
London School argued that ‘we’ philosophers had the metalinguistic task of 
clarifying our concepts and thoughts, making sure that teachers, policy 
practitioners and educational researchers had ‘clean’ and well-ordered con- 
cepts to go about their business with. It’s a view that does find some echoes 
in Wittgenstein, perhaps less in the later than in the early Wittgenstein, but 
quickly became doctrinaire and ideologically dangerous because it was asso- 
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ciated with the view both in philosophy and philosophy of education that 
this was/is the only true description of philosophy – a meta-activity that 
made sure our concepts and language was in order, or a form of analysis 
that depicted our conceptual schema. 
The linguistic turn was an unassailable and wholesale sea-change in 
twentieth-century philosophy that captured two fundamental insights: the 
claim that all knowledge is dependent upon its expression in language (all 
thought is language-dependent) – as Wittgenstein suggested ‘what can be 
said can be said clearly’ and ‘that we cannot speak of we must pass over in 
silence’ – and the goal of philosophy is to provide an understanding of our 
conceptual schema in order to resolve problems that arise from the misuse 
of words. This is not an investigation of the world but rather a step removed 
– a meta-activity that seeks agreement to resolve conceptual confusions that 
arise in our use of concepts. ‘The linguistic turn’ was a phrase popularized 
by Richard Rorty in 1967 with a collection of the same title – The Linguistic 
Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method. He adopted the term from the 
Austrian philosopher Gustav Bergmann. The notion of ‘the linguistic turn’ 
while originally used to describe the rising influence of logical positivism, 
especially the work of Rudolf Carnap and others, Wittgenstein-inspired phases 
in the history of analytic philosophy also came to represent and provide a 
description for a range of very different intellectual movements that for 
want of better descriptors I have christened postpositivism, postmodernism, 
poststructuralism and postcolonialism – four compassing but very different 
intellectual movements dominating the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries in science and the humanities. Wittgenstein helped inaugurate and 
in part was responsible for the linguistic turn in its various phases of the 
history of analytical philosophy and I have argued that he demonstrated 
certain affinities with themes of the other three movements. He was also, 
and partly, as a consequence of the linguistic turn, responsible for inspiring 
the cultural turn and the associated turn to practice and space that presently 
characterizes the social sciences. 
This personal intellectual trajectory that mirrors developments and move- 
ments in theory in part accounts for why I wrote a book called The Last 
Book on Postmodernism (Peters, 2011). The title for me echoes Nietzsche’s 
‘last man’ and the kind of eschatology that goes with much postmodern 
thinking: the end of history, the end, of ideology, the end of philosophy etc. 
As an ironical title I wanted to clearly signal that we are now in an era 
removed from these movements; that these movements while significant and 
powerful in shaping our sensibilities and understandings have passed their 
peak and are now waning, even if their interests and effects will continue to 
be felt widely in the arts, humanities, and social science for many years to 
come. Also I have to say that this was my last book on postmodernism/post- 
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structuralism. I do not have anything more to say about the topic – some 
might argue that I have already said too much. Now I want to move on with 
this intellectual heritage as a basis for approaching new geopolitical and 
philosophical questions no longer in the shadow of the ubiquitous ‘post’ – 
essentially a negative and reactive rhetorical strategy – but in the light of 
the ‘inter’– ‘intercommunication’, ‘interculturalism’, ‘Internet.’  
 
2. The Linguistic Turn: Ideal and Oxford Language Philosophy 
 
In The Linguistic Turn Richard Rorty (1967) wrote of the metaphysical dif- 
ficulties of linguistic philosophy associated with the thought of Wittgenstein 
and that led to the revolutionary attempt to turn philosophy into a science 
through the adoption of a new ‘presuppositionless’ method. By ‘linguistic 
philosophy’ Rorty (1967) meant the ‘view that philosophical problems are 
problems that can be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, or 
by understanding more about the language we presently use’ (p. 3). This 
revolution like others in the history of philosophy has been inspired by the 
search for a neutral standpoint that rested on the understanding that philo- 
sophical questions are questions of language – the metaphilosophical pre- 
supposition that united both ideal language philosophy (ILP) and ordinary 
language philosophy (OLP). The thrust of Rorty’s argument developed further 
in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) was that there are no criteria 
or test for successful analysis in either ILP or OLP. 
Rorty offered detailed and technical arguments that need not detain us 
here. The original collection of The Linguistic Turn included 28 essays by 
prominent analytical philosophers including classic statements on the notion 
that philosophical questions are questions of language, sections devoted to 
statements concerning ILP and OLP, and a final section on the future of 
analytic philosophy. The 1992 edition included also two essays by Rorty 
reflecting on the original collection ten and twenty five years later. Writing 
in 1990 reflecting on the original essay written in 1965 he comments that the 
assertion ‘the problems of philosophical are problems of language’ seems 
confused on two counts: first, philosophy no longer is an ‘activity’ for him 
and second, there is ‘no such thing as language in any sense which makes it 
possible to speak of “problems of language”’ (p. 371). He refers to Donald 
Davidson’s (1975) paper ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’ that 
gives up on the dualism between scheme and world and therefore also on 
the concept of representations about which post-Kantian philosophers were 
concerned to find out what made them true or false. No longer can we hold 
that analytical philosophy is born out of a linguistic turn establishing the 
study of language as the foundation of the discipline. 
 38 
P. M. S. Hacker (2005) provides a more elaborate picture of the history 
of analytic philosophy. He suggests it ‘originated in Cambridge in the late 
1890s with the revolt, by the young Moore and Russell, against the neo-
Hegelian Absolute Idealism that had dominated British philosophy in the last 
third of the nineteenth century’ (p. 1) and describes Wittgenstein’s logical 
atomism of the Tractatus as the culmination of the first phase and the primary 
source of the next two phases that he gives as Cambridge philosophy of the 
1920s and 1930s under Ramsey, Braithwaite and Wisdom, and the logical 
empiricism of the Vienna Circle. The second phase was short-lived and the 
third, with a focus on the logic of scientific language, was interrupted by the 
Nazis. The leading members of the Circle including Carnap, Feigl, Reich- 
enbach, Hempel, Frank, Tarski, Bergmann, Gödel, ‘fled to the USA, where 
they played a major role in the post-war years in transforming American 
pragmatism into logical pragmatism’ (p. 2). 
Hacker (2005) suggests that the fourth phase was OLP led by Ryle and 
Austin, ‘with Berlin, Hampshire, Hart, Grice, and after 1959, Ayer (influenced 
by the Vienna Circle), and among the postwar generation Strawson and Hare’ 
(p. 3). Interwoven with postwar Oxford philosophy was a strand based on the 
Investigations including the work of von Wright, Wisdom and Anscombe. 
The fourth phase, Hacker suggests declined in the 1970s and gave way to 
American logical pragmatism in the work of Quine, Davidson, Putnam and 
(in Britain) Dummett. 
In making this assessment Hacker (2005) like Rorty looking back ac- 
knowledges that there is a great deal of confusion over what constitutes the 
linguistic turn. He writes: 
 
Rorty sensed, rightly I think, that a deep and important change 
had occurred in analytic philosophy in the 1930s and 1940s – a 
shift in the conception of the problems and methods of phi- 
losophy that to some extent bridged the gulf that separated the 
Vienna Circle and affiliates (with all the differences there were 
between the Schlick/Waismann wing, on the one hand, and the 
Neurath/Carnap wing, on the other) from Oxford philosophers 
and affiliates and followers of Wittgenstein (with all the differ- 
ences between them). Despite these great differences both within 
and between these two streams, a sea-change had occurred (p. 
10). 
 
Hacker goes on to state: 
 
With the benefit of another thirty eight years’ hindsight, I myself 
should wish to elaborate Rorty’s account. The linguistic turn, I 
suggest, was taken when it was proposed  
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1. That the goal of philosophy is (a) the understanding of the 
structure and articulations of our conceptual scheme, and (b) 
the resolution of the problems of philosophy (to be specified by 
paradigmatic examples), which stem, inter alia, from unclarities 
about the uses of words, from covert misuses, and from mis- 
leading surface grammatical analogies in natural languages. 
2. That a primary method of philosophy is the examination of 
the uses of words in order to disentangle conceptual confusions. 
3. That philosophy is not a contribution to human knowledge 
about reality, either superior to or on the same level as scientific 
knowledge, but a contribution to a distinctive form of under- 
standing. 
This turn had been initiated by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. It 
could be completed only when the metaphysical doctrines of the 
Tractatus were jettisoned and the logical doctrines accordingly 
modified. This was effected by Wittgenstein himself in the 1930s, 
and, partly under his influence, by the Vienna Circle (p. 11). 
 
At the same time Hacker acknowledges Dummett’s (1978, 458) view and 
then disagrees with each of his propositions of characterization. Dummett’s 
statement here is important because it typifies, even if wrongly, the fun- 
damental attitude of the era that saw philosophy’s main task as analyzing 
the structure of thought via language. 
 
Only with Frege was the proper object of philosophy finally 
established: namely that the goal of philosophy is the analysis 
of the structure of thought; secondly that the study of thought is 
to be sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological 
process of thinking; and, finally, that the only proper method for 
analyzing thought consists in the analysis of language. ... The 
acceptance of these three tenets is common to the entire analytic 
school. 
 
Hacker then also portrays Williamson as arguing that the representational turn 
has displaced the linguistic turn in that both thought and language are part 
of the more general category of representation and the analysis of repre- 
sentation ought to be the goal of philosophy as they are both manifestations 
of mind, and against Williamson Hacker, invoking Kant, maintains that 
philosophy is the proper understanding of the structure of our conceptual 
structure. 
The culmination of a historicist movement in philosophy of science that 
began to impact on crude forms of empiricism: Quine’s ‘two dogmas of 
empiricism’; Popper’s critical rationalism; Feyerbend’s epistemological an- 
archy in Against Method; and Kuhn’s sociology of science that opened the 
flood gates (even if he protested against the radical interpretation of his 
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work), to cultural studies of science, the anthropology of the laboratory, the 
strong Wittgensteinian program with Bloor and others at Edinburgh. Positivism 
was on skid row and post-positivism began its unsteady rise to paradigmatic 
status, even if its intellectual status was short-lived and its practices that were 
quickly institutionalized outlived their intellectual usefulness as they began 
to be cemented into an acceptable consensus. Post-positivism was soon chal- 
lenged by postmodernism in its different forms, including poststructuralism. 
Postpositivist philosophers of education had difficulty in particular accepting 
the challenge of the concept of power as it came down to them in the form 
of Foucault’s ‘power/knowledge’ and later concept of ‘governmentality.’ The 
debates concerning methodology after Foucault soon became entrenched – 
scholars took sides, polemics ensued and open intellectual debate was stul- 
tified. In some ways this was a repeat of the history of the debate that took 
place between Habermas and Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida. 
Yet, the development of an ethos of flexibility to a textual approach to 
the past to me seemed liberating. The Cambridge interpretation of Wittgen- 
stein, that became a place-holder in the history of contemporary philosophy, 
did not seem possible or palatable any longer, even though there are Cam- 
bridgean influences, continuities and overlaps. The black cat of rhetoric had 
been let out of the bag of factual empirical history and there was no going 
back. Even if the past is all that is the case, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, 
unvarnished facts by themselves did not provide the framework of intel- 
ligibility for establishing an unambiguous narrative – if facts are theory-
laden and multiple narratives can be made to square with the facts then any 
view of scientific history was let off the hook and the openness of the past 
became permanently established. History, historiography, metahistory of 
everything including philosophy seemingly reduced everything to a text and 
narrative. 
Wittgenstein’s antifoundationalism and antirepresentationalism in phi- 
losophy of language and epistemology seems only to make sense against 
early modernism in philosophy based on the Cartesian search for certainty 
that the later Wittgenstein rallied against. The anticartesian reading of Witt- 
genstein’s Investigation and On Certainty is now well established with his 
attack on essentialism and the attempt to give firm foundations to knowledge 
through the strategy of subjectivity and focus on the lonely ‘cogito.’ His 
style of Lichtenbergian composition based on notebooks that recorded flashes 
of insight as ‘raw data’ to be ‘composed’ (musically or operatically – with 
many voices) later and his use of metaphor and narrative rather than sys- 
tematic argumentation still only resonate for me against the background of 
formal experimentation that characterizes the high point of literary or poetic 
modernism with its beginnings in the historical moment of Russian formal- 
ism and its extension by means of the European avant-garde. 
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3. Structuralism, Post-structuralism and Post-poststructuralism 
 
For me the accidental discovery of Lyotard was accompanied by a reading 
of Althusser, as was ritualistically demanded as part of critical culture in the 
1970s’ Western university especially by my neo-Marxist colleagues. Actually I 
enjoyed Althusser’s emphasis of ‘reading’ and interpreting Marx, although 
I had difficulty with the view that there was one correct reading on the 
argument that if one can establish new readings then the process of inter- 
pretation must be endless especially with rich and complex texts and thinkers 
(like Marx) that permit and encourage multiple readings. With Althusser, 
and with many others of like mind I went on to rediscover the canon that 
comprises structuralist linguistics and poetics focusing on Roman Jacobson’s 
circle, Bakhtin’s circle, structuralist anthropology centered on Claude Levi-
Strauss, structuralist epistemology based on Gaston Bachelard, Michel Fou- 
cault and others, including neo-Kantians, such as Konrad Lorenz and Jean 
Piaget as well as the Kantian constructivists in philosophy of mathematics 
such as the Burbaki group. The process was also motivated by the attempt 
to come to terms with ‘poststructuralism’ in the very different works of 
Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida 
and the coterie of French feminist structuralists like Luce Irrigaray, Helene 
Cixious and others. This reading progression demanded as well the reading 
of predecessors, Nietzsche and Heidegger in particular, and a study of the 
Heidegger-Nietzsche nexus that assumed such significance in French thought 
during the 1960s with the first Nietzsche conferences led by Gilles Deleuze 
in the early 1960s. 
The later Heidegger’s philosophy of language that finds its phenom- 
enological roots is not in the structure of Dasein but in the original clearing 
into which Dasein is already thrown. In a strong sense Heidegger and Witt- 
genstein are the instigators of the linguistic turn – Wittgenstein for analytic 
and post-analytic philosophy, Heidegger for Continental philosophy (and 
especially phenomenology and hermeneutics) – a turn which is for both 
symptomatic of philosophy’s failure to come to terms with itself. Karl-Otto 
Apel (1979) and Katherine Rudolph (2006) attempt to show that the ‘turn’ 
to language in the twentieth century is governed in both traditions by an 
Augustinian heritage. And as Rudolph (2006) points out Jacques Derrida in 
Speech and Phenomena interrogates Husserl’s Logical Investigations – the 
radical irreducibility of language as the condition for sense and meaning. In 
this sense Derrida’s project is also aimed at a critique of a certain picture of 
language embodied by Augustine that accepts the privileged concept of 
‘presence’ that sanctions the entire Western philosophical project. Remember 
Wittgenstein’s Investigations begins with a critical reception of the August- 
inian picture theory of language and a reference to Augustine’s Confessions 
 42 
– ‘When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved 
towards something, I saw this and I grasped that that the thing was called 
by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out.’ And as Witt- 
genstein (1972: para 1) goes on to observe: 
 
These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the 
essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in 
language name objects – sentences are combinations of such 
names. –In this picture of language we find the roots of the fol- 
lowing idea: Every word has a meaning. The meaning is cor- 
related with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.    
 
Poststructuralism and its intellectual antecedents also seemed to play into a 
wider canvas that from the first origins of European formalism tracked the 
developments of high modernism in art and literature as parallel and inter- 
secting conversations. Yet after the death of Foucault in 1984, even though 
he remains the most cited author in the social sciences and humanities, and 
thereafter the deaths of Deleuze, Lyotard and Derrida, poststructuralism 
seemed to be on the wane. Its highpoint came in the 1980s with largely 
rhetorical battles with Habermas, doctrinaire Marxism, and, of course, cul- 
tural conservativism, over allegations of relativism and the like. Certainly, 
postmodernism as a movement in architecture and the arts was the first to 
fall victim to the university cycle of intellectual fashion and commodity-
fetish in criticism. As the critic Charles Jencks noted, postmodernism quickly 
moved through the cycle from rebellion and resistance to institutionalization 
and acceptance, as witnessed by the anthologies that began to flourish in 
the 1980s in a variety of fields. The canon had been identified, the terms of 
debate had been stabilized and the life had been drained from any residual 
movement of resistance that still remained. 
In some ways education had been slow to respond to postmodernism and 
poststructuralism. Principally, Henry Giroux, Peter McLaren, Doug Kellner, 
Joe Kincheloe, Colin Lankshear, Patti Lather, Jim Marshall, Tom Popkewitz 
and myself were among the first to respond and engage with these move- 
ments in the early to mid 1980s. Some like Henry Giroux remained within 
the realm of cultural studies in interpreting the broad implications of post- 
modernism; others like Jim Marshall and Tom Popkewitz focused on Foucault; 
and scholars like Patti Lather interrogated the movements for what they 
meant for feminism and educational research. Peter Mclaren renounced post- 
modernism for Marxism, leading the Left charge against postmodernism. 
By the nineties there were scholars who could be identified in education 
who were involved in the explication de text of Lyotard, Foucault, Derrida, 
Irigaray and others (Peter Trifonas, Gert Biesta). And of course there were 
those who sought to dethrone French theory from the perspective of one 
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existing branch of education and educational research, most often positions 
that comprised a combination of liberal politics and liberal epistemology of 
science – Denis Phillips and Wally Feinberg come to mind 
At the same time, postcolonial criticism from its origins in Hegelian 
phenomenology and originary statements in Fanon and Cesaire received a 
strong impetus from phenomenology, structuralism, and later poststructuralism 
and began to accompany and then take over from poststructuralism as the 
dominant paradigm of cultural criticism, supplemented by the whole gamut 
of a range of critical movements and methodologies in feminist, psycho- 
analytical, and neo-Marxist thought. But postcoloniality, and in so far as it 
drew systematically on wider theoretical insights from poststructuralism and 
poststructuralist and cultural Marxism, also seems to have reached a kind 
of intellectual stasis that followed the hiatus of Edward Said’s Orientalism 
(1978) and Cultural Imperialism (1991). It feels as though the main elements 
of the program have been identified and now most of that required is the 
working over of full case-study detail in all their historical complexity and 
particularities. In some ways postcoloniality readily mapped onto existing 
concerns in studies of racism, gender and class in educational theory and 
yet its theoretical trajectory now seems more wedded to global studies of 
education, to globalization, and to neoliberalism in education policy, than 
simply to the critique of Western imperialism. In this regard we witness the 
beginnings of new studies of post-Occidentalism, a speculative hue of thought 
about the end or the decline of the West and the rise of the Rest, to use the 
terms of both Oswald Spengler and Stuart Hall. 
I was recently greatly encouraged in this reading when I discovered the 
essay by Nancy Partner (2009) called ‘Narrative Persistence: The Post-
Postmodern Life of Narrative Theory’ in an edited collection Re-figuring 
Hayden White (Ankersmit et al, 2009). Partner asks what is left behind after 
postmodernism and the linguistic turn apart from the social constructedness 
of knowledge. She quotes Michael Roth in this regard indicating that he 
thinks after the ‘massive tide of language...has receded’ the next waves of 
theory might be ethics, intensity, postcolonialism, empire, the sacred, cosmo- 
politanism, trauma, animals – Partner herself adds ‘memory, experience 
agency, religion and the sublime. Yet these seem to be little more than tropes, 
themes, issues that could easily come from the theoretical wellspring of 
postmodernism. Partner then continues to document the fact that ‘sometime 
around 1990 or thereafter, or maybe a little later, the linguistic turn has 
succeeded in turning everything into a text’ (p. 83) and while the textuality 
and language-embeddings of history and just about everything else is not 
reversible, ‘semantic analysis, large-scale structural analysis, rhetoric, and 
tropes’ and critical modes of discourse analysis, have reached their shelf 
life, which is to say that they have quickly become methodologized and 
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institutionalized so that the critical life has been drained from them. I am 
more than sympathetic with this view except that it is strange for a historian 
to embark on a rhetorical historiography of philosophy (as it affects history) 
without recognizing the context nature of that history and the political nature 
of its descriptions. It seems only narrative and narrative analysis persist. 
Partner (2008, 827) makes the case in an earlier paper: 
 
The whole point (to put it reductively) of postmodernism was to 
challenge the authority of authority, with special attention to the 
production and presentation of knowledge in the humanistic dis- 
ciplines: history, literature, and anthropology. Narrative theory 
was introduced to most of the humanities as part of the post- 
modern linguistic-turn repertoire dedicated to exposing the tex- 
tuality, the constructedness, and unacknowledged ideological 
freight of narrative form, a cultural artifact made of language. 
Narrative theory denaturalized the story form in its central function 
of imposing intelligible form on time. This move, the pivotal 
postmodernist move of destabilizing the linguistic forms of 
knowledge-presentation, was most problematic for professional 
historians. The other humanities disciplines recognized immediate 
postmodernist benefits. Unpacking and exposing the instability 
of verbal meanings, of all modes of representation whether at 
the single word/world level or the more interesting ambiguities 
of whole narrative accounts, mainly enriched literary study, 
arming critics with yet sharper instruments for uncovering the 
suppressed and denied secrets of canonical texts. 
 
And Partner (2008, 830–831) also deftly explains the pedagogical conse- 
quences for historians: 
 
As we more and more clearly enter the post-postmodern moment, 
whatever cultural form that eventually takes, most of the linguistic 
turn’s instruments, including narrative theory, seem assimilated 
to routine academic purposes, ideologically tamed to ordinary 
seminar room use. Narrative should have sunk well below the 
surface of visible cultural ferment, along with deconstruction, 
social constructionism, semiotics, and the like. Professional his- 
torians, and literary/cultural critics, seem hardly to have noticed 
that narrative, as a self-consciously deployed weapon for making 
real claims on the real world, had escaped its university pre- 
cincts to gain traction and accelerate through the world of post-
cold war resurgent nationalisms. Every instance of this neona- 
tionalist self-assertion (examples force themselves on our attention 
daily) comes to its most intense expression around the story, “our 
story,” in classic narrative form. The formulation and defense of 
the national narrative is a central feature of every new assertion 
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of national claims in every part of the world where state struc- 
tures are fluid or unstable, and every such narrative is constructed 
to meet and counter another version which must be denied. 
 
She goes on to discuss the status and role of narrative construction in 
public settings and in constructing public memory as a collective narrative 
form that speaks to older forms of belonging and recounting and the reality 
of imagined communities that are constructed from ‘human intention, aspi- 
rations, and a deep sense of collective identity and are thus real and persistent 
over time’ (p. 832). Again, I am sympathetic to this call for stock-taking 
and I too have a sense of the moment of postmodernism being ‘over’ – its 
highpoint has passed us by and while remaining as part of the theory 
archive it seemingly has lost its critical edge. Isn’t this what ‘institutional- 
ization’ consists in – reading lists, courses, shortcuts, anthologies – actually 
the heart of historiography itself in creating an archival memory. Yet I also 
need to register a protest against the method of argument because narrative 
has never been the same after narratology, after the application and refine- 
ment of structuralist and linguistic methods, first with the Russian formalists 
and then, partly as consequence, with Paul Ricoeur, Tzvetan Todorov, Algirdas 
Greimas, Roland Barthes, and, of course, Hayden White who derives his dis- 
tinctive synthesis from Giambattista Vico and Erich Augerbach, with apologies 
to Leopold von Ranke, Jules Michelet, Alexis de Tocqueville, Jacon Burck- 
hardt, and almost the entire canon of nineteenth century philosophers of his- 
tory. Barthes (1975) argues that every narrative is interwoven with multiple 
codes and these help comprise its multiple meanings. Through the herme- 
neutic, proairetic, semantic, symbolic, cultural codes we imposed historical 
order, stabilized meanings at least temporarily in order to assert interpretations. 
In these terms narrative analysis and narratology grow out of structural- 
ism and are subject to all the refinements and continuing debate that post- 
modernism puts on the agenda. If I was forced to say simply what comes 
next, crudely speaking, then I would respond: returns – the return to ontology 
(Badiou), the return to Marxism (Ranciere), the critical return to Marx and 
Freud (Deleuze); circulations – second generation cybernetics and systems 
theory as applied to globalization and global systems including global 
knowledge and learning systems, the pervasiveness of the new biology and 
ecological models of all descriptions, the emergence of digital theory, digital 
materialism, immaterial labor, ‘cybernetic’ understandings of capitalism 
(cybernetic political economy), mathematics of complex systems, topology; 
interdisciplinaries – biology and history, biology and education, and…; 
historiographies – encouraging the greater awareness of the constructedness 
of disciplinary history and their ability to wrongfoot us; interculturalities – 
with an emphasis on cultural practices of everything, interculturalism; spa- 
tialities – almost done, but reinterpreted and reintegrated with temporal 
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studies after the spatial turn; integrations – intersections, internationalisms, 
interactions; differences – perhaps, enough said already? 
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